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Abstract
Managing information resources including
protecting the privacy of customer data plays a critical
role in most firms. Data breach incidents may be
extremely costly for firms. In the face of a data breach
event, some firms are reluctant to disclose information
to the public. Firm may be concerned with the
potential drop in the market value following the
revelation of a data breach. This paper examines the
impact of data breach incidents to the firm’s market
value/equity value, and explores the possibility that
certain firm behaviors may reduce the cost of the
incidents. We use regression analysis to identify the
factors that affect cumulative abnormal stock return
(CAR). Our results indicate that when data breach
happens, firms not only should notify customers or the
public timely, but also try to control the amount of
information disclosed. These findings should provide
corporate executives with guidance on managing
public disclosure of data breach incidents.

1. Introduction
As the information technology in business
develops, many companies store and process large sets
of customer data, which may include sensitive personal
information. Incidents of data breaches that reveal
company secrets or confidential client information can
affect the firm seriously [1][17]. Leakage of sensitive
information may cause customers to lose trust in the
company and lead to the loss of a firm’s market value
[1]. Several studies have demonstrated the impacts of
data breach incidents on stock price [1][15][17]. These
studies show that data breach announcements lead to
significant negative market return. For example,
Telang and Wattel [25] evaluate the impact of software
vulnerability announcement on firms, and find that
firms will lose 0.6% of their market value. Cavusoglu
et al. [9] conclude that firms lose 2.1% of their market
value within two days after the announcement of a
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breach event. Several studies state that the exposure of
confidential data will result in negative CAR
[1][15][17].
Different characteristics of data breach events have
been identified in the previous literature. Researchers
extract different characteristics of these incidents and
evaluate their impacts to firm’s market value. They
find that some of the variables have very significant
impacts on the stock return. Some of the recent studies
are listed in Table 1. As shown in Table 1, researchers
have mainly focused on evaluating the impacts of
breach types, time, firm’s characteristics and types of
industry to firm’s market value. Chai et al. [26]
evaluate the SOX law’s impact to the market reaction
and conclude that CAR is more positive after the law.
Firms that belong to different industries will have
different market reactions to breach events. CAR due
to information security breach is larger for BSFI
(Business, financial, service, insurance) firms [19].
Internet specific companies suffer more on stock value
after security breach incidents [2].
Although there are extensive empirical studies on
the impacts of breach types, industry types and firm
characteristics on firm’s market value, little is known
about the firm’s actions toward data breach incidents,
and how investors react to firms’ actions. Our paper
differs from previous studies in that we aim to examine
whether the variations of market reactions can be
explained by the firm actions after the breach events
(see Table 1). In the face of data breach events,
different companies may take different actions. The
content of news media may reflect these actions. But
from the literature review, we find that few papers
mention possible firm actions toward the data breach
events and their impacts to firms’ equity value.
According to previous literature [13] and our
observation of data breach incidents, we know that
some firms are reluctant to disclose information about
data breaches to their customers or the public. Firms
may be concerned with the potential drop in firm
equity value following the revelation of a data breach.
In this paper, we believe whether the firm chose to
disclose information to the public after the data breach
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Table 1 Summaries of previous literature and comparison with this paper
Categories

Variables

Studies

Findings

Vulnerabilities of
software

Telang and Wattel (2007)

Lose 0.6% market value

Availability

Gordon (2011)

Exposure of
confidential data

Acquisti et al. and Gatzlaff (2006)
Gatzlaff, K. M., & McCullough, K.
A. (2010)
Campbell et al. (2003)

Breach type

Time

Before or after law
(SOX)
Earlier discovery of
breaches
Before or after 911
Firm Competitiveness

Firm
characteristics

Firm Size

Cavusoglu et al. (2004)

Earlier discovery is better

Gordon (2011)

Pre 911 significant, after not
Pre 911 not significant, after 911
significantly negative

Telang and Wattel (2007)
Telang and Wattel (2007)

Significantly negative

Das et al. (2012)

CAR is larger for smaller firms

Cavusoglu et al. (2004)

Goldstein et.al (2011)

Cavusoglu et al. (2004)
A. Hovava and J. D’Arcy (2003)

Type of
industry

BFSI (Business,
financial, service,
insurance)

Firm actions
(not related to
events)

Firm reactions
related to
events

Das et al. (2012)

Smaller firms lose more
Large companies have positive
CAR
Negatively affected by security
breach
CAR due to IS breach is larger
for internet firms
Internet firms lose big
Internet specific company suffer
more
CAR due to IS breach is larger
for BSFI firms

Goldstein et.al (2011)

Negatively affected by security
breach
Negatively associated with CAR

Acquisti et al. (2006)

>100000 significant

This paper

CAR significantly negative

Damage potency

Telang and Wattel (2007)

More severe significantly
negative

Clustering the textual
contents of information
security in 10-K report

Tawei Wang et al. (2013)

Significant if disclosing security
risk factor with action-oriented
terms in 10-K

Investment for IT
security improvement

Chai et al. (2011)

Positive CAR

Provide patches

Telang and Wattel (2007)

CAR significantly positive

This paper

CAR significantly Positive

This paper

CAR significantly Negative

SIC60/62

Severity

Negative CAR
CAR more positive after the law

Das et al. (2012)
Internet specific
industry

Negative CAR

Chai et al. (2011)

Acquisti et al. (2006)
Firm Growth

CAR significantly impacted by
breach type availability
Negative CAR

Number of individuals
affected
Number of records
breached

Notify customer or
public
More event
information disclosed

Leung and Bose (2008)
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is a strategic action. This decision may determine the
change of market value of the firm.
In order to obtain information about the different
firm actions after the data breach events, we utilize
data collected by The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse1.
This database provides a description of each data
breach event. We find that whether the firm initiates to
disclose data breach information to the public can be
revealed from the textual contents of the description.
We seek to discover whether this type of firm action
will impact the firm’s market value during the data
breach event period. 2 Using content analysis on the
description of the data breach events, we evaluate
whether the results will have impacts on the firm’s
equity value through an empirical study. Our findings
on the anticipated market reaction should provide
corporate executives with guidance on managing
public disclosure of data breach incidents.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. After
the introduction, four hypotheses are derived in Section
2. We then describe the data collection process and
methodology in Section 3. Next, we analyze the textual
data of the disclosed information about the data breach
events and present the results of data analysis and
implications in Section 4. Finally, we conclude the
paper with a discussion of contributions, limitations
and future research in Section 5.

2. Theoretical backgrounds and hypotheses
development
Previous event studies [1][15][17] show that the
announcement of a data breach incident will cause a
negative effect to firm’s market value. But no literature
considers the firm’s decision to notify the data breach
event to customers or the public as a factor to impact
the market return. In our view, timely disclosure can be
used to reduce the legal and reputation cost of bad
news [25]. Firm’s disclosure behavior also prevents
competitors from unambiguously inferring that these
firms are hiding information [8]. A previous study
shows that voluntary disclosure of bad news is a
special type of disclosure sometimes necessary for
firms [22]. Other studies find that stock price responses
to voluntary disclosures vary [8][24]. As mentioned
1

It is a nationally recognized consumer education and advocacy
nonprofit dedicated to protecting the privacy of American consumers.
Data were collected from http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach
2
The information on the database is usually updated 1 or 2 days after
the event happened. From our observation, we think the content of
the event description usually can reflect the main information that
was related to the event. We assume the description of the events can
reflect some actions performed by the breach company 1 or 2 days
after the data breach.

	
  

previously, most firms seek to withhold data breach
information in fear that the breach disclosure may
affect their market value. Early research in Accounting
shows that firms chose to disclose only when it can
maximize their profit [28]. We believe that although
data breach announcements may lead to negative
market reactions, if a firm initiates the notification to
their customers or the public early, the result could be
different since this will add confidence to the investors
due to timely disclosure. Even though companies could
try to withhold the breach information, the events may
be disclosed by other news media, which may cause
the investors to lose trust in the company.
However, although we believe that a firm would
benefit from voluntary disclosure of data breach
events, the effect may not be equal for all the events.
The severity of the event would weaken the benefit of
voluntary disclosure. Previous research shows that if
the breach announcement suggests that the breach is
severe, it could cause a significantly negative impact to
the firm’s CAR [25]. We believe the disclosure of a
data breach event with larger data record loss could
lead to more negative confidence on a firm’s security
controls. The notification of severe data breach events
could damage a firm’s reputation and cause loss in
share price. Therefore, the benefit of voluntary
disclosure would depend on the severity of the event.
We believe that the number of records breached could
be a good proxy to measure the severity of the data
breach event. Thus, we hypothesize:
H1a: Firms’ early initiation of notifications to
customers or the public about data breach incidents
will positively affect CAR.
H1b: Higher number of breached records would
weaken the positive effect that voluntarily disclosure
would bring.
The amount of breach related information to
disclose is another issue that firm managers need to
consider. To determine the amount and type of
information to disclose, firms face a number of tradeoffs. Better disclosure can increase investor awareness
of the firm and hence reduce the cost of capital and
increase equity valuation [5]. According to Berglöf and
Pajuste [5], when providing firm information to
shareholders, better performing firms should disclose
more. Greater disclosure benefits the firms with good
news, but the effect is exact opposite for firms with bad
news to disclose [29]. It suggests that the disclosure of
more bad news information may carry direct financial
costs to the firm. Research also shows that there are
increased costs from increased transparency [13].
Based on the previous research, we believe that firms
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have to weigh the costs and benefits of the amount of
information disclosed to the public. We think that for
bad news like data breach incidents, too much
information disclosure may signal higher severity and
cost to remedy the incident and may cause negative
impact to the company’s equity value. Therefore, we
hypothesize:
H2: More information disclosed related to the data
breach events will lead to more negative CAR.
By studying 79 breach events, Acquisti et al. [1]
states that a breach of more than 100,000 subjects will
reduce the return on stock price by 1.2%. A company’s
costs for data breach events depend on the number of
individuals whose information has been compromised.
Telang and Wattel [25] manually categorize breach
events as severe or not, and find that the security
breach events categorized as severe could cause a
significantly negative impact to the firm’s CAR. As
mentioned earlier, we believe that the number of
records breached could be used to measure the severity
of the data breach event. Larger data record loss could
lead to larger financial losses due to litigation and
remedy measures. Thus we have:
H3: The number of records breached will
negatively affect the CAR.
Repeated disclosure of severe data breaches and
newspaper headlines could lead to a significant
reputation damage and loss in share price [1]. We
believe that for severe data breach events, exposure of
larger amount of event related information may draw
investors more attention on the severity of breach
events, and more likely lead to loss in reputation and
investor trust. If both the amount of event related
information disclosed and breach records are in
relatively high levels, we expect that negative
cumulative abnormal market return would be higher
than if there were higher amount of event information
disclosed but a lower number of breach records. We
would also expect that negative CAR would be lower if
there are low levels of both the amount of information
disclosed and breach records. Therefore, we
hypothesize:
H4: Higher amount of breach event related
information disclosed and higher number of breached
records will cause more negative CAR to a company
than otherwise.

3.1. Data collection
Our data collection consists of a two-step process.
First we use data breach events provided by Privacy
Rights Clearinghouse. The information of Privacy
Rights Clearinghouse is obtained from verifiable media
sources, government web sites, or blog posts with
information pertinent to the breach incidents in
question. The database contains a chronology of data
breach incidents from 2005 to present. We use the
events that happened between 2005 and 2015. There are
4712 events collected from the database during this
time period. The data breach events are included in our
sample if the firms are public trading companies in the
USA. After filtering, we included 517 events. Then, in
order to verify the data sources, we also extracted
events from news articles using keyword searching in
Factiva. We collected news articles about these public
trading firms that have breach announcements reported
in major news media during the 10-year window. We
searched in the Factiva database and used the following
terms: (1) data breach, (2) hack, (3) virus, (4) privacy
breach, (5) cyber attack, (6) unauthorized access, (7)
data theft, (8) identity theft, (9) phishing, (10) denial of
service. This method is similar to one used in previous
studies [15][16][32] for finding breach events. After
this process, we identified 101 data breach events that
happened to firms traded in the USA. We find that in all
case the 101 events are included the Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse database within 1 or 2 days after the
event happened.
Table 2. Distribution of events by year
Year

Number of Events

2005

25

2006

71

2007

63

2008

30

2009

22

2010

77

2011

47

2012

60

2013

63

2014

48

2015

24

3.1. Methodology
3. Data collection and methodology

In this paper, we use the event study method to
compute the cumulative abnormal return (CAR), based
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on a sample of 517 data breach events that happened to
the publicly traded companies in the US. Event study
methodology has been used extensively in
management science and finance to measure the impact
of various corporate events [1][15][27]. To better
compare our results to the previous research, we used
similar methodology applied in earlier event studies
about market reactions to breach events [1][21][25].
We estimate CAR using the four-factor model
[6][20]. Several studies have estimated abnormal
returns using the four-factor model [30][33]. The fourfactor model posits a linear relationship between the
stock return and four factors over a given time period
(Formula 1):

Rit = α i + R ft + βi1[Rmt − R ft ]+ βi2 SMBt

(1)

+ βi3 HMLt + βi 4UMDt + εit
where Rit is the return of stock i on day t, αi is the
intercept of the relationship for stock i, Rft is the riskfree return on day t, Rmt is the return on the market
portfolio on day t, SMBt is the small minus big size
portfolio return on day t, HMLt is the high minus low
book-to-market portfolio return on day t, UMDt is the
past-one-year winners-minus-losers stock portfolio
return on day t, and εit is the error term [14]. Abnormal
returns are defined as the difference between the actual
return and an estimated expected return in the absence
of an event. The estimation window is generally
between 120 days and 200 days. In our case, we define
a 200-day estimation period, starting at day -200 until
day -11 before the event announcement. We end the
estimation period 10 trading days prior to the event
day.
Using OLS regression over the estimation period of
200 trading days, we estimate the parameters of the
four-factor model. The abnormal return ARit for firm i
on day t is the difference between the actual and the
expected return. The abnormal return from the fourfactor model is as follows:

ARit = Rit − (α̂ i + R ft + β̂i1[Rmt − R ft ]+

(2)

β̂i2 SMBt + β̂i3 HMLt + β̂i 4UMDt + εit
Since we have N observations (N = 517 events), the
mean abnormal return across all observations can be
N

calculated as A t = ∑ ARit . The cumulative abnormal
i=1

return (CAR) for a given time period can be calculate
using

t2

CAR[t1, t2 ] = ∑ A t

(3)

t=t1

The period of interest for which we conduct the event
study is known as event window. The date of
announcement is defined as day 0. In practice, the
event window often includes day 0 and day 1. By
using Formula 3, we calculate the CAR for the event
over the event window.

4. Results
Our interest in this paper is to explore whether firm
actions toward the breach events will have impacts on
the market reactions to the incidents. For each of the
517 events we collected, we calculate the cumulative
abnormal returns (CAR) using event window of day 0
and day 1. The CAR results are used as a dependent
variable in our analysis. After estimating the CAR, a
regression analysis is conducted to investigate the
possible factors behind a firm’s market value loss. In
the regression model, we control firm size, firm
industry, and breach time, which are often found by
previous research to be associated with abnormal
market return [12][18][32]. We also consider several
factors that rarely appear in data breach event studies
including whether firm initiates the notification to the
public, the amount of information disclosed and
number of records breached.
We analyze the language used in the event
description collected by Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
database. According to our observation of the event
description data for the 517 events, we believe that the
event description can reflect the main information that
relates to the event. When measuring whether a firm
initiates the notification to the public, we look at
whether the description contains “notify”, “inform”,
“announce”, “disclose”, “release” and similar words.
(Table 3) D_Notify is 1 if the event description
contains these words and without negative vocabulary
before them. D_Notify is 0 otherwise. For the 517
events, 121 of the events are marked as 1 for D_Notify.
We also look at the length of the description; we think
that the longer length suggests more information of the
events were disclosed. At last, we measure the impact
of breached records. In our analysis, the logarithmic
transformation is used to measure the length of the
description and the number of records breached.
We develop three regression models. The variables
we observe and the definitions are listed in Table 4.
The results of the regression model are listed in Table
5. In all three models, VIF values for our variables
ranged from 1.03 and 1.46, below the VIF value of 10.
So our models don’t have the concern for
multicollinearity. A comparison of Models 1, 2 and 3
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suggests that the variables promoted by this paper will
better indicate the market reaction toward data breach

events.

Table 3: Sample events with or without firm initiated notification
Date public Company
3/2/15
Natural Grocers

Keywords
Announce

Description
Natural Grocers announced a possible data breach of its
customer payment cards. The grocery retailer claims they have
not received any reports or complaints…

1/5/15

Morgan Stanley

Notify

An employee of Morgan Stanley stole customer information on
350,000 clients including account numbers…The employee has
since been fired and the bank is notifying all of the individuals
affected….

9/2/14

The Home Depot

Announce

The Home Depot has announced the data breach they suffered
earlier this month has affected approximately 56 million credit and
debit cards. This makes this breach the second largest breach
ever…

5/24/12

General
Communication
Inc. (GCI)

Notify

A former customer service representative gathered account
information directly from two customers…. GCI decided to notify
all other customers who may have been contacted by the
dishonest former employee….

6/9/11

Citibank

Release

Hackers have managed to access the information of
approximately 1% of Citibank's 21 million users… Citibank
released an official statement on the Citigroup website…

9/21/07

Citigroup

8/12/08

Wells Fargo

/

Notify

Three spreadsheets containing 5,200 Social Security numbers
and other personal details about customers were inadvertently
leaked over an online file-sharing network by a former employee.
Tiversa, a company that monitors P2P networks, found Excel
spreadsheets from the desktop of a financial analyst at ABN.
Although Tiversa found over 10,000 files, deduplication revealed
only 5,208 unique Social Security numbers, along with names and
what type of mortgage each customer had.
Wells Fargo is notifying customers that hackers have accessed
their confidential personal data by illegally using its access codes.
Personal information including names, addresses…

The first model we only use the control variables
raised by previous studies. The model equation:

CAR[t1, t2 ] = β 0 + β1Firm _ Size + β 2 Industry _ BSR +

β3 Industry _ BSF + β 4Time + ε

(4)

The result in Model 1 is very similar to the previous
studies. Larger firm size will have significant positive
impact on firm’s performance after the breach.
Negative CAR due to data breach is larger for firm
belongs to business, financial and insurance industry.
The year 2008 to 2009 is significant negative.
Using Model 2, we evaluate the firm action related
variable D_Notify. We tested the statistical
significance of firm’s action of initiate the notification

of data breach. The result indicates the market
reactions to data breach after taking into consideration
of firm behavior. We control the variables in Model
1. The model equation is:

CAR[t1, t2 ] = β 0 + β1D _ Notify + β 2 D _ Length +

β3 D _ Record + β 4 Firm _ Size +
β 5 Industry _ BSR + β 6 Industry _ BSF

(5)

+ β 7Time + ε
Table 5 shows the coefficient estimate for D_Notify
(0.0029). The significant positive coefficient of
D_Notify suggests that when the firm initiates the
notification to customers or the public, there is a
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statistically significant positive market reaction. We
measure the amount of event related information
disclosed using D_Length (-0.0088). The significant
negative coefficient of D_Length suggests that if too
much event related information is disclosed to the
public, it will have negative impact on a firm’s market
reaction. Model 2 adds number of records breached as
another variable to test the market reaction. With
coefficient at -0.0007 and p-value less than 0.05, the
results indicate that the market reaction is significantly
negative toward the number of records that was
breached in a data breach event. Thus the results
support our Hypothesis 1a, 2 and 3.
In Model 3, we add interaction term
D_Notify*D_Record to measure whether the
interaction between voluntary disclosure and breach
record would cause impact on CAR. With coefficient

at -0.0013 and p-value less than 0.05, we conclude that
larger number of breached records would weaken the
positive effect of voluntarily disclosure. We also add
D_Length*D_Record to evaluate whether the
interaction between the amount of event related
information disclosed and the number of records
breached have more negative impact on a firm’s CAR.
With p-value <0.0001, we conclude that the impact of
D_Length on abnormal return depends on the level of
D_Record significantly. The coefficient estimate
(Table 5) for D_Length*D_Record (-0.0028) suggests
that D_Length will enhance the negative impact of
D_Record and vice versa. We conclude that firms with
larger number of records breached and more event
related information disclosure will have greater
negative CAR. Thus Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 4
are supported.

Table 4: Model Variables and Definitions

Dependent
Variable

Independent
Variables

Control
Variables

Variables

Definition and Calculation

CAR [t1,t2]

Cumulative abnormal return over [0,1] event window, measured in
percentages

D_Notify

Dummy variable equals to 1 if firm initiates the notification of data
breach event

D_Length

The length of the event description, indicating the amount of event
information disclosed. Values have been transformed using the
logarithm function.

N_Record

The number of records breached in the data breach event. Values
have been transformed using the logarithm function.

D_Notify*D_Record

The interaction term between voluntarily initiates the notification of
data breach event and the number of records breached.

D_Length*D_Record

The interaction term between the length of the event description and
the number of records breached.

Firm_Size

Total assets of the firm. Values have been transformed using the
logarithm function.

Industry_BSF

Dummy variable equals to 1 if the firm belong to Business- financial
and insurance service

Industry_BSR

Dummy variable equals to 1 if firm belong to BusinessRetail/Merchant

Time

Measure whether it is year 2008-2009.
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Table 5: CAR Regression Results Given the Characteristics of the Data Breach Events
Model (1)

Model (2)

Model (3)

Coefficient(t-statistic)

Coefficient(t-statistic)

Coefficient(t-statistic)

0.0043(-1.48)

0.0107(2.36)**

0.0046(0.99)

D_Notify

0.0029(1.97)**

0.0033(2.23)**

D_Length

-0.0088(-4.15)***

-0.0051(-2.30)**

N_Record

-0.0007(-2.31)**

-0.0002(-0.73)

Variables
Intercept

D_Notify*D_Record

-0.0013(-2.15)**

D_Length*D_Record

-0.0028(-3.82)***

Firm_Size

0.0013(1.79)**

0.0015(2.32)**

0.0013(2.22)**

Industry_BSF

-0.0023(-1.55)

-0.0026(-1.74)*

-0.0021(-1.47)

Industry_BSR

0.0011(0.73)

0.0014(0.92)

0.0017(1.15)

Time

0.01(-4.67)***

-0.0101(-4.67)***

-0.0095(-4.54)***

0.06

0.10

0.15

517

517

517

R

2

N Observations

*Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%

5. Discussions and Future Research
We believe that our study offers a worthwhile
contribution to the existed literature. We find new
factors that can indicate some types of firm actions
toward data breach event. By looking at the result of
our investigation, we think that firms can take possible
managerial controls on data breaches. Our finding
indicates that the market will reward firms that take the
action to notify the customers immediately after the
breach event. The results show that firms that initiate
the notification of data breach event timely will have a
positive impact on the market return. However,
although voluntary disclosure of data breach events can
have a positive effect to CAR, larger number of breach
records would weaken the effect. The observation can
provide help when firms face the dilemma that
disclosure of data breach event may cause damage to
the firm’s public image. We also investigate the
association between the amount of information that
was disclosed to the public and market reaction. We
believe that greater amount of event related
information disclosure will lead to more negative stock
reaction. We further find that firms with both larger
amount of event related information disclosed and

larger breached records will have greater negative
market reaction. We find that market tends to punish
more for the firms when the amount of event related
information and number of records both increased.
Although firms may not be able to manipulate the
amount of information available to the public related to
the data breach event, firms may have some extent of
controls over the information that will be disclosed to
the public. We believe this result is useful in helping
firms design their proper incident response planning
strategies. When a larger number of records was
breached in the event, firm should disclose less event
related information to the public in less regulated
industries.
The limitation of our study mainly lies in the data
we used. This paper used the event description
collected and updated by the Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse database. The descriptions are the
secondary sources collected from news media,
government site or blogs. This may not reflect all the
information that investors may take into consideration.
Future research may build on our results and perhaps
validate our findings through more comprehensive sets
of data. Second, the keywords we are using may not
reflect all the firm’s voluntarily disclosure behavior.
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Some actions performed by firms toward data breach
event could be missing from our data. In the future, we
will improve our categorization scheme and have more
comprehensive analyses on the firm actions. Third,
when calculating the CAR, we didn’t use control firms
as a benchmark. We plan to add this in our future
work. Fourth, this paper only measures short-term
market reaction around the breach date. However,
more information regarding to the data breach
incidents may be added in follow-up news articles,
which we did not consider in this study. This will be
addressed in our future work.
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